On Environmental Policy and Permitting

The literature on environmental policy under adverse selection usually assumes that firms' profit vary monotonically with a private information parameter. However, it is easy to demonstrate using standard production setups that regularity is not the rule. We show that policy requirements are very sensitive to this assumption. In particular, the optimal instrument resembles more an “adaptable” pollution standard than the economic instrument of an environmental tax. We also show that permitting, which results in some firms overinvesting in pollution‐control equipment, does not serve the objective of improving the environment but rather allows the agency to increase the proceeds of the policy.     

STABILIZATION POLICY, LEARNING-BY-DOING, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

This paper shows that fiscal policy, when used for stabilizationpurposes, can have a positive effect on the economy's growth,on human capital accumulation, and on welfare. We introducestochastic productivity shocks into a model in which productivityis augmented through learning-by-doing If future benefits oflearning-by-doing are not fully internalized by workers, thenrecessions are periods in which opportunities for acquiringexperience are foregone. We identify configurations of disturbancesand other parameters for which a countercyclical policy maximizesgrowth and welfare.     

Breaking Collusion in Auctions through Speculation: An Experiment on CO2 Emission Permit Markets

The European Emission Trading Scheme (EU‐ETS) has chosen to adopt an auctioning procedure to initially allocate CO₂ emission permits. Free allocation of permits will become an exception for the third phase (2013–2020) and most firms will have to buy all their permits on the market or via auctions. The ability of bidders to collude is a key concern about the design of the auction format. To counter collusion, the auction can be open to bidders without compliance obligations (speculators). This paper aims at studying experimentally speculation as a collusion‐breaking device in two different auction mechanisms: the uniform‐price sealed‐bid auction and the ascending clock auction. Our results suggest that a uniform sealed‐bid auction open to speculators should be chosen from a revenue maximization point of view. In this mechanism, compliance agents adopt an aggressive strategy toward speculators. This strategy significantly increases the seller's revenue, compared to the more collusive clock auction. In the latter, on the contrary, bidders accommodate speculators, letting them buy permits in the auction and buying their necessary permits on the secondary market. However, as opening the auction to speculators deteriorates efficiency, the regulator faces a trade‐off between these two objectives.     

PURE INDICATOR OF RISK APPETITE

We study the concept of risk appetite, that is investors' willingness to buy risky assets. Market players and researchers have tried to find a proxy for it, notably by means of spreads in high yielding markets like credit or emerging markets. However, these measures might be biased because they hinge on series of prices that include market movements due to the re-pricing of both systemic and specific risks. Being macro factors that affect all the assets in the universe, risk appetite and risk aversion can only produce systemic risk re-pricing. We apply a methodology to correct this bias. We analysed emerging market debt capital markets and compute a systemic risk only indicator that enables one to ascertain more precisely periods in which risk appetite might have driven market returns. We find that from the end of 1997 to 2004 only about 30 per cent of the return of the EMBI+ might have been due to changes in risk appetite.     

Performance Measurement under Asymmetric Information and Investment Constraints

The fact that investment policies are often restricted appears to have been neglected in the performance measurement literature. This paper, using a standard information model, shows how the introduction of constraints on the proportion of assets to be invested in the market affects the expected portfolio returns and the value of a portfolio manager's performance. The results are related to the classical Treynor and Mazuy (1966) conjectures about characteristic lines.     

Credit Contagion from Counterparty Risk

Standard credit risk models cannot explain the observed clustering of default, sometimes described as "credit contagion." This paper provides the first empirical analysis of credit contagion via direct counterparty effects. We find that bankruptcy announcements cause negative abnormal equity returns and increases in CDS spreads for creditors. In addition, creditors with large exposures are more likely to suffer from financial distress later. This suggests that counterparty risk is a potential additional channel of credit contagion. Indeed, the fear of counterparty defaults among financial institutions explains the sudden worsening of the credit crisis after the Lehman bankruptcy in September 2008.     

The Impact of Mandated Disclosure on Performance‐Based CEO Compensation*

Regulators argue that mandated compensation disclosure improves corporate governance by permitting shareholders to enjoin boards of directors to reward executives in ways that are consistent with shareholder value creation. We posit that mandated compensation disclosure, or the absence thereof, has a greater impact on the CEO compensation practices of widely held firms than of closely held firms. More specifically, we expect that, in the absence of mandated disclosure, CEO compensation is likely to be less performance‐contingent among widely held firms than among closely held firms. Moreover, we also expect that the advent of mandated disclosure leads widely held firms to increase the extent to which CEO compensation is performance‐contingent, much more so than closely held firms would. We use a unique data base resulting from the Ontario Securities Commission amendment of regulation 638 in October 1993. For the first time, this amendment required firms listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange to provide detailed executive compensation data similar to those required by the Securities and Exchange Commission, for the current year as well as retroactively for the previous two years. We find that, in the absence of mandated disclosure, CEO cash compensation in widely held firms is less performance‐contingent than in closely held firms. With the imposition of mandated disclosure, performance‐contingent cash compensation increases more in widely held firms than in closely held firms. Results with respect to stock option grants are mixed, with both closely held and widely held firms reacting to the advent of mandated disclosure.